To Wael and Hazem...again

Last week, the Economist magazine addressed the issue of the transition of power in Egypt, warning that the country is enduring a difficult labor and may deviate from the righteous path of democracy. The Economist magazine editor wrote: “Beneath the chaos lies a complex power struggle between generals and Islamists. The West should back the latter.” This position is very consistent with what the magazine put forward during the latter stage of 2011, regarding the need to engage the Islamists. The difference today is that the Economist is calling for the transfer of power – or the “revolution”, if you prefer – to the Islamists entirely, rather than merely calling to engage them. In the same context, the recent cover article of Time magazine focused on the situation in Egypt and was entitled “The revolution that wasn’t”. In this piece, Jay Newton-Small and Abigail Hauslohner argued that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] and the remnants of the former regime are trying to bury the Egyptian “revolution”, and that hope lies with the Islamists, represented in the victory of President Mohammed Mursi, in order for Egypt to move away from the whims of the military. The authors claimed that Mursi and the Brotherhood were the only hope to tip the balance in favor of forming a consensual democratic government, which is more than the Brotherhood initially hoped to achieve. The article suggested that these Islamists are now able to change the political dividing lines in Egypt, so that matters focus on the conflict between a civil state and military rule, rather than a conflict between the Islamists and secular democrats. This is just a sample of what is being published in the Western press, where there is strong, enthusiastic support for the rise of the Islamists. The Islamists are being portrayed as if they are the democratic forces and human rights activists who were persecuted in previous eras, and now it is their turn to lead the transition towards a civil state! Much of what has been written alternates between oversimplification and generalization. How can the Islamists, with their various currents, be considered better than previous regimes, without any consideration of their ideas and history? When were the Islamists ever advocates of pluralism or supporters of civil liberties? How can it be said that a conflict between the Islamists and the secularists has ended abruptly with the fall of the former regime? Or that the Islamist community’s crisis with modernity has been resolved by the Islamists winning the elections? The Islamists have every right to participate in elections and engage in political work, but it is not correct to attribute certain opinions or stances to them that are contrary to their ideological convictions and rhetoric. Even if they have changed some of their stances as a political tactic, or by taking into account the current circumstances and balances, this does not mean that an ideological shift has taken place within the Islamist’s narrative, or that they are prepared to give this ideology up. There is no doubt that the “Arab Spring” debate has changed in the space of one year. We were initially told that these revolutions had emerged to fight against dictatorships and oppression, and that they were being led by youths without ideological inclinations, seeking to reject the ideas and practices of the past. Yet here we must return to the very first questions, ideas, and the former players themselves. What does it mean for the Islamists to win elections in every “Arab Spring” country where voting has taken place? The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi currents have captured the political scene entirely to form these countries’ forthcoming constitutions and regimes. In the past, the debate revolved around choosing between dictatorship and democracy, between tyranny and freedom. Today, it has become a choice between the Islamists or the military and remnants of the former regime. In truth, this is a disappointing result for some, and an encouraging result for others. In April last year I wrote an article entitled “To Wael and Hazem: Every revolution has its good and bad”, in which I tried to spark a discussion using the cases of the prominent Lebanese writer Hazem Saghiya and the Egyptian activist Wael Ghoneim. This was at a time when by universally celebrating the popular revolutions – or uprisings – we were failing to ask the necessary questions: Can a modern civil state be built in Libya? Are there trained technocrats and economic experts available to improve living standards in Tunisia? Does Egypt have an independent, nationalist current to draft a civil and secular constitution away from the military and the Islamists? How can power be transferred peacefully in Yemen in a manner that ensures the country does not disintegrate? Unfortunately, “Arab Spring” literature soon transformed into a laudatory discourse; championing the “revolutions”, honoring the alleged martyrs and recovering from the previous regimes. Lines were blurred between men of the former regime and technocrats of the country, between the country’s structural problems and the corruption of its ruling elite, and between the authoritarian nature of the former regime and the solitary reforms it achieved in this country or that. Just over a year later, articles and reports began to criticize some of the negative aspects of the revolution, especially the chaos and violence that followed the collapse of those regimes. However, no one acknowledged that the enthusiasm and seduction of the moment had engulfed activists, commentators and observers, so that they neglected the main concerns and dismissed the substantial challenges with regards to the economy and state-building. Voices of criticism were marginalized and deemed to be living in the past, or unaware of this momentous change in history. The debate surrounding the “Arab Spring” passed through a phase of drowning in a utopian dream after a long spell of dictatorship. At the beginning of the revolutions, Hazem Saghiya wrote claiming that the choice was “between a disaster which has been developing in multiple phases over dozens of years…and the disaster which is happening en masse at the moment, but may pave the way for foundations for the future”. However, during the last few weeks Saghiya’s position has changed from cautious optimism to frustration, or what he called “a lack of meaning and direction”. Commenting on the results of the Egyptian elections won by the Muslim Brotherhood, Saghiya wrote: “the electoral process has begun to mirror ambiguity and conflicting wills rather than the popular will; it is a painting that depicts political impossibilities more than it depicts prospects for the future”. (Destructive ambiguity, al-Hayat newspaper, June 23rd). On the other hand, Wael Ghoneim, the Google executive to whom the outbreak of the January 25th revolution is largely attributed to – an activist who was celebrated in Western forums and presented with several international awards – does not seem concerned or upset by what has happened in Egypt, namely that a Muslim Brotherhood candidate has been elected. There is no shame in electing an Islamist, this is the voter’s individual right, but in doing so I do not think you can refer to yourself as an advocate of the civil state or human rights. There are various trends amongst the Islamist groups; some of them adhere to the aforementioned principles, whilst others have their own perceptions on what is religiously permissible with regards to these “Western values”. The image of the young man, Wael Ghoneim, who challenged the Mubarak regime on the eve of the revolution, is now overshadowed by another image, namely the image of him cheering enthusiastically for the Muslim Brotherhood’s winning candidate. In other words, a young man who was portrayed in the Arab and Western media as a democratic and civil example seeking to peacefully stand up to tyranny in order to secure public freedoms, is nothing more than a young affiliate of the Brotherhood (in its modern guise), who opposed the military regime. This does not diminish the courageous role that he played, but we must call a spade a spade. In the film “American Gangster”, Frank Lucas (played by Denzel Washington) tells one of the other characters that “when you own something, you can call it what you want”. Popular uprisings took place in some Arab countries for many reasons. Those who reaped the spoils are able to call it what they want, but others are not obliged to accept this. --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.